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ABSTRACT
Existing models of organizational crisis response effectiveness provide useful insights but are
limited in terms of offering a guide for practitioners dealing with actual crisis situations. This
analysis examines the relative effectiveness of image repair tactics based on differences in root
causes of crisis events. Results suggest that certain image repair tactics are seen as the most and
the least effective regardless of crisis type. At the same time, there were some differences across
crisis types that could guide practitioner tactic choices. Limited results here and in past research
raise questions about whether image repair tactic effectiveness can be usefully mapped to situational variables, such as audience or crisis type. This article concludes with discussion on this
matter and suggestions for future research.
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Organizations must be continually prepared to respond to crises, recognizing the potential for high financial and/or reputational costs.
Crisis practitioners must understand how to deal with crisis situations
quickly, avoid speculation, and apply strategy grounded in “insights that
can be applied effectively and ethically under extraordinary pressures
of limited time and severe scrutiny of the organization’s legitimacy”
(Heath, 2010, p. 3). Ideally, clear crisis plans based on such strategy
are readily available, but the reality is often quite different. According to a 2014 international crisis management survey, 20%–25% of
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respondents, including organizations that classified themselves as highrisk operations, did not have a plan (“Preparing for Crisis,” 2014).
Understanding how and what to communicate during a crisis is a
critical part of any crisis plan. It is essential that researchers engage in
work to help determine what constitutes effective crisis communication and what industry best practices should be. However, according to
Coombs (2014), “effective applied communication does help to improve
the field to which it is applied. Unfortunately, the academic literature
on crisis communication is both vast and difficult to assess at times,
making it of limited value to crisis communicators” (para. 30).
Some have called for more empirical testing of crisis communication tactics (An & Cheng, 2010; Avery, Lariscy, Kim, & Hocke, 2010;
Blaney, 2016; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006), and in response to that call, this
quantitative analysis examines the relative effectiveness of image repair
tactics for various organizational crisis types. It applies Benoit’s typology, one of the most recognized frameworks for examining corporate,
political, and organizational crisis responses (see Benoit, 1995b, 2006;
Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit,
1999; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; DiSanza, Legge, Allen, & Wilde, 2012;
King, 2006). Most research using the typology comprises qualitative
case studies focused on singular crisis events. These approaches have
obvious limitations in terms of making general claims about the impact
of different tactics in crisis situations. Because testing the effectiveness of such claims is vital if research is to advise practitioner choices,
research must begin to map tactical choices onto contingencies like
audience and crisis type. This study, therefore, was guided by the following research question: What specific image repair tactics result in
more positive and/or more negative perceptions of an organization
based on differences in crisis type?
Literature Review

Some quantitative tests of image repair in organizations have focused
on the relative effectiveness of different tactics. For example, Twork
and Blaney (2013) tested the premise that mortification combined with
promises of corrective action would be more effective than mortifica-
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tion only. They found no significant differences between approaches.
Dawar and Pillutla (2000) discovered that, in the case of a harmful
consumer product, clear mortification, clear recall measures (corrective
action), and restitution (compensation) were superior to stonewalling
and ambiguous attempts at mortification and corrective action. In a
related study, Spence, Lachlan, and Omilion-Hodges (2016) looked
for differences in the impact of mortification and corrective action on
participants’ perceptions of organizational reputation; however, both
were found to be equally effective. Cos, Worrell, and Blosenhauser
(2016) exposed audiences to different paired tactics and found that
audiences exposed to mortification and corrective action had more
positive feelings toward the organization than those exposed to minimization and transcendence. When respondents in the study were
asked what they would have liked to have heard from the offending
organization, 53% responded with comments that could be categorized
as corrective action.
Some past work has tied image repair tactic effectiveness to crisis
type in ways that are similar to our goals in this study. Most of this
work tests Coombs’s (2007) situational crisis communication theory
(SCCT). SCCT suggests that crisis managers will select more effective
persuasive response tactics if they understand the kind of crisis situation they are experiencing. Based on attribution theory, Coombs’s
(2006) theory suggests that the reputational threat a crisis presents
is defined by the audience’s perception of four things: (a) crisis type,
as determined by the audience’s perception of whether responsibility
for the crisis was external or internal; (b) severity of the damage; (c)
whether organizational history includes many or few past crises; and
(d) relationship history, defined as the audience’s attribution of the
quality of the relationship it has with stakeholders.
Audience attributions are seen as resulting from how the media
“frame” and cover the crisis—specifically the facts and values that they
choose to emphasize—thereby influencing how the audience perceives
the crisis. According to Coombs (2007), except in cases of crises that
unfold online, “the frames used in the news media reports are the frames
that most stakeholders will experience and adopt” (p. 171).
Coombs’s (2007) model includes a set of recommended response
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tactics to match crisis type that should produce maximum image repair
benefits. Empirical support for matching response tactics to crisis types
is mixed. Coombs and Holladay (1996) found that matching crisis response to crisis type produced significantly more reputational benefits
to the organization than mismatched responses, although the effect sizes
were small. Other studies (Brown & White, 2011; Claeys, Cauberghe,
& Vyncke, 2010) found no significant improvement in organizational
reputation when crisis strategies were matched to crisis type.
This study is consistent with the goals of work grounded in Coombs’s
model. However, as explained later, we take a different approach to operationalizing crisis type in an attempt to uncover findings that are both
more robust and more useful for real-world practitioner applications.
Method

This study adds to the body of quantitative research testing image repair strategy effectiveness. It was designed as a continuation of earlier
exploratory work (Gribas, DiSanza, Legge, Hartman, & Santee, 2016) in
which audience type, based on audience perceptions of responsibility
and severity, was considered as a possible influence on tactic impact.
In the current study, the focus is not on audience type but rather on
crisis type.
Classifying Organizational Crisis Types

The approach to defining crisis type here is grounded in practical application. When crises arise, public relations (PR) practitioners are called
on to make quick messaging decisions that are truthful and ethical, that
protect affected publics, and that also minimize image damage and/
or maximize image repair. As noted earlier, it would be best for these
decisions to be based on solid, empirically verified guidelines rather
than on speculation or instinct.
Models provided by both Benoit (1995a, 2015) and Coombs (2006)
offer valuable insight into the world of organizational image repair;
however, both are limited in their capacity as the basis for a real-world,
real-time guide. Benoit’s (1995a, 2015) model is, by design, a typology
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only rather than a predictive tool. The many case studies based on
the typology offer valuable help, as practitioners, aware of these case
studies, can draw connections between a current crisis and what has
worked (and not worked) in the past in a similar situation. However,
PR practitioners would need to be extremely well read to be aware of
enough cases to make this approach viable. Also, inevitable differences
between past organizational crises and any current situation make even
the most informed reasoning by analogy tenuous at best.
Coombs’s (2006) SCCT model, on the other hand, is designed for
predictive insight. As noted, empirical support for its theorized predictions is limited. Yet even if SCCT had stronger empirical support,
its usefulness to PR practitioners would be questionable. To apply
Coombs’s model, a PR manager would need to accurately gauge the
following in the very early stages of a crisis: audience determination of
responsibility as external or internal, audience assessment of damage
severity, audience awareness of the organization’s past crisis history, and
audience’s judgment of the relationship quality between organization
and stakeholders. Gauging such perceptual complexity would be difficult, if not impossible. These are essentially individual-level variables,
and as Benoit (2015) has pointed out, audiences are not monolithic. For
example, some may view crisis damage as relatively small, while others
see the same result as severe, or while some are keenly aware of past
crises in the organization’s history, others are unaware of that history. It
is likely, especially in the early stages of a crisis, that the organization is
“simultaneously in multiple situations” (Benoit, 2015, p. 38). Additionally, almost every organizational crisis today unfolds online as well as
in the mainstream media. The explosion in online news sources, social
media, and microblogs has reduced the mainstream media’s ability to
frame the particulars of a crisis in any unified way, likely exacerbating
the perceptual fragmentation in any target audience.
To provide usable advice for practitioners, we wanted something
more than an image repair strategy typology, but we also wanted a way
to assess crisis type based on something less complex and more immediately accessible than individual attributional and perceptual variations.
We considered Campbell’s (1999) list of nearly 40 crisis types, Coombs’s
(1999) somewhat reduced list (natural disasters, malevolence, technical
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breakdowns, human breakdowns, challenges, megadamage, organizational misdeeds, workplace violence, and rumors), and numerous PR
or business communication textbooks that contain similarly extensive
lists of possible threats to organizations. From this, we sought to identify a small number of mutually exclusive and reasonably exhaustive
categories. The result was a four-category scheme for organizational
crisis type based on general root cause: malevolence, managerial failure,
systemic failure, and natural disaster.
A malevolence crisis occurs when an actor inside or outside the
organization takes serious action, often to express anger toward the
organization. Such action includes shootings, bombings, sabotage,
product tampering, or malicious rumors designed to damage the organization. For example, in 1982, a still unknown person laced Tylenol
capsules with potassium cyanide, killing seven people. Other examples
include the Pepsi syringe scare of 1993 and the Wendy’s finger incident
in 2005. In these cases, people made fraudulent claims about a product
to bring a tort lawsuit against the firm.
In a managerial failure crisis, management knowingly acts in ways
that cause harm or risk of harm for organizational stakeholders or
knowingly chooses not to act to prevent such harm or risk. Lerbinger (1997) suggested that manager-created crises usually result from
some combination of skewed management values, deception, and
misconduct. The uncontrollable acceleration problems of some Toyota
vehicles were blamed on Toyota’s skewed emphasis on production over
quality and clearly fit into the managerial failure category. The subprime
mortgage crisis that led to the Great Recession was created by all three
managerial causes at several of America’s biggest investment banks and
mortgage insurers.
Systemic breakdown crises can occur in any complex, tightly coupled
organizational environment and usually include unlikely or difficult to
anticipate technological failures or technology–human interface errors.
The Chernobyl disaster and the flawed Affordable Care Act online
rollout fit into this crisis type category.
Finally, a natural disaster crisis occurs when there is damage to
life, property, or the environment through weather or other “acts of
God.” For example, an airliner crashing because of an unpredictable
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microburst is an example of a natural disaster. Another example is
when fires forced almost 90,000 people, the entire community of Fort
McMurray, Alberta, Canada, to be evacuated in May 2016.
While it has some similarities to what Coombs (2007) called “crisis
clusters,” this categorization scheme differs in that it does not ask PR
practitioners to assess complex patterns of audience perception to
match an appropriate image repair strategy. An overarching narrative
about the root cause of a crisis is more identifiable, consensual, and
stable than estimations of audience organizational knowledge, judgments, and attributions. It is in this way that we believe our approach
offers promise as the basis of a more practitioner-friendly and usable
crisis response guide.
Image Repair Strategies and Tactics

This study employed Benoit’s (1995a, 1997, 2015) typology, which outlines
five general ways people and organizations respond to accusations of
wrongdoing: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness
of the event, corrective action, and mortification.
Denial includes both simple denial and shifting the blame. Simple
denial occurs when the accused rejects the existence of or involvement
in the wrongdoing, and shifting the blame occurs when the accused
attempts to avoid blame by shifting it to another individual or organization.
Evasion of responsibility includes making one of four tactical arguments: (a) The act was in response to another’s wrongful act (provocation), (b) it was not possible to act otherwise given a lack of information or ability (defeasibility), (c) the act was an uncontrollable mistake
(accident), or (d) the motivation for the act was positive or virtuous
(good intentions).
Reducing offensiveness of an event includes six tactical variants: (a)
redirecting negative perceptions by focusing on positive characteristics
or good things the accused has done in the past (bolstering), (b) arguing
that the act is not as bad as some may think (minimization), (c) making an untoward act look more favorable by comparing it to other less
favorable options (differentiation), (d) reframing an issue with a focus
on higher and more important issues (transcendence), (e) questioning
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the credibility of whoever is making accusations (attacking the accuser),
and (f) alleviating blame by reimbursing victims (compensation).
Finally, corrective action occurs when the accused promises a plan
to deal with the consequences of the problem and/or to prevent a similar problem in the future, and mortification occurs when the accused
admits responsibility and asks for forgiveness.
Other typologies exist (e.g., Coombs, 1998), though they are less
comprehensive. Few have even suggested additions to the Benoit typology, and when suggested (e.g., Brinson & Benoit, 1999), the additions have not been adopted by later researchers. Therefore the more
exhaustive and discriminating nature of Benoit’s typology made it the
best option for this study.
Participants

Participants were students attending a mid-sized public university in
the Intermountain West of the United States. Instructors of various
communication courses were contacted and asked to assist in recruiting individuals from their classes by announcing the opportunity to
participate during a class session. Interested students were given information related to accessing an online questionnaire. Cooperating
instructors were asked to offer some minimal extra credit as incentive
for participation, and all participants were given the opportunity to
be entered into a drawing for one of two $100 Amazon gift cards by
voluntarily identifying themselves by name and cooperating instructor.
A total of 323 individuals provided surveys usable for this study. Most
students were enrolled in courses that were part of university general
education requirements, resulting in a sample broadly representing
the campus population.
Online Questionnaire

Online materials directed participants to indicate consent by marking a
check box and advancing to the survey questionnaire. The online questionnaire first directed each participant to read one of four scenarios—
determined by a random selection process—relating to the collapse of
a university building balcony that resulted in 95 injured students and
3 deaths. The basic scenario/crisis outcome was the same for all, but
each participant received a scenario edited in a way that framed the
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organizational crisis as one of four types based on the ultimate root
cause of the crisis: malevolence, managerial failure, systemic failure, and
natural disaster. For example, the following was the unique crisis framing for participants who were presented with the malevolence scenario:
Further investigation revealed that the support struts had been purposely weakened. The investigation quickly focused on a disgruntled
former employee at the university’s maintenance shop who was recently
fired. When he was arrested and questioned, the former employee
admitted to the crime.

This manipulation allowed for examination of differences in perceived
effectiveness of tactics across crisis types.
Then each participant considered 14 possible organizational responses made by the president of the university in follow-up to the
crisis. Organizational responses each represented one image restoration
tactic reflected in the Benoit (1995a, 2015) typology. For example, the
following item was designed to have participants consider a “simple
denial” tactic:
Take a moment to reflect again on what you just read about the incident
at Millersville State University. Be sure to think through the scenario
carefully, stopping to reflect on all the information provided.
Now imagine that, approximately one week after the collapse, you
are watching a televised report related to the incident. Part of the report
includes video of the President of Millersville State University who has
prepared an official statement.
Now imagine the following—Even though the President addresses a
number of issues, at the end of the presentation, it seems clear to you
that his main point could be summarized as follows: “The university
was not in any way responsible for the incident.” If the President focused on this in the report, indicate the likely impact that would have
on your perception of the university.

Participants were presented with each response individually, one at
a time, and rated each response before moving to the next for consideration. They rated each response on a 10-point scale ranging from 1
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(This would have a very negative effect on my perception of the organization) to 10 (This would have a very positive effect on my perception of
the organization). The sequence of these 14 organizational responses
was randomized for each participant to avoid order bias.
Analysis

Consistent with the analysis approach taken by Gribas et al. (2016), the
data were examined in two ways. First, mean scores for positive and/
or negative impact of each image repair tactics were calculated. These
average scores were calculated for the total sample as well as for each
of the four crisis types (malevolence, managerial, systemic, natural disaster) to allow for a simple comparison. Second, MANOVA was used,
with crisis type serving as the single fixed factor and effect ratings for
each of the 14 Benoit image repair tactics serving as multiple dependent
variables. Post hoc analysis was performed for all dependent variables
showing significance.
Results

As explained earlier, a random selection process was used to place
online survey participants into one of four crisis type groups. Of the
323 participants included in this analysis, 74 responded to a crisis suggesting malevolence, 70 to a crisis suggesting managerial failure, 93 to
a crisis suggesting systemic failure, and 86 to a crisis suggesting natural
disaster as the root cause.
Rankings of Image Repair Tactics for Crisis Types

Table 1 shows the means and relative rank ordering of the image repair
tactics for each crisis type as well as the means and rank orderings for
the overall sample. One thing that stands out from this table is that
there is a good deal of similarity across crisis types in terms of the
relative rankings of the 14 tactics. Compensation and corrective action
were ranked 1 and 2 (or tied for 2), respectively, for all four crisis types,
suggesting that these tactics are perceived as having the most positive
impact on organizational image regardless of crisis type. In fact, these
two tactics along with mortification and good intentions made up the
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top four spots across all crisis types. These consistencies offer support
for previous claims that
corrective action, compensation, and mortification are all likely to help
in a crisis and almost certainly will not hurt an organization’s image,
as long as the image repair messages are perceived by audiences as
sincere, and the organization follows through with commitments to
correct problems or compensate victims. (Gribas et al., 2016, p. 54)

On the other end of the ranking spectrum, with only minor exceptions, attacking the accuser, provocation, shifting blame, and simple
denial were the four tactics perceived as having the most negative impact
on organizational image across crisis types. So, overall, the rankings
show a good deal of similarity across crisis types for both the highest
ranked and lowest ranked tactics. Comparisons of these data to data
from earlier research (Gribas et al., 2016) suggest that certain tactics
just seem to be overall better and worse regardless of the crisis situation.
MANOVA and Post Hoc Analyses

The purpose of this study was to uncover ways in which the positive or negative impacts of particular image repair tactics seem to be
dependent on crisis type. The foregoing consideration of means and
relative rankings of tactics across crises suggests that crisis type makes
rather little difference. However, results from a more robust analysis,
applying MANOVA and follow-up post hoc procedures, offer more
finely tuned insights.
The results of the MANOVA were statistically significant, F(42,
924) = 3.436, p < .000, Pillais’s trace = .405, partial η2 = .135, supporting the idea that the degree to which image repair tactics influence
audience perceptions of an organization during a crisis is impacted
by crisis type. Because of this, follow-up ANOVAs were conducted to
determine which of the 14 tactics seem to be dependent on crisis type.
A Bonferroni correction suggested applying an alpha of .0036 or lower
to indicate significance for the follow-up ANOVAs.
From the follow-up ANOVAs, 5 of the 14 tactics showed significance based on the corrected alpha: simple denial, F(3, 319) = 9.961,
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TABLE 3

Significant Tactic Effectiveness Differences for Crisis Type Pairings
Crisis type

Crisis type
Malevolence

Managerial

Systemic

Natural disaster

simple denial

simple denial

shift blame

shift blame

shift blame

accident

defeasibility

accident

accident
good intentions
Managerial

defeasibility

simple denial

accident

defeasibility

good intentions

accident
good intentions
transcendence

Systemic

p < .000; shifting blame, F(3, 319) = 11.693, p < .000; defeasibility,
F(3, 319) = 10.989, p < .000; accident, F(3, 319) =22.457, p < .000; and
good intentions, F(3, 319) = 6.692, p < .000. Results for transcendence,
F(3, 319) = 3.885, p < .009, approached significance at the corrected level
and would have been highly significant for an uncorrected ANOVA.
Because of this, and because of the unique nature of transcendence
noted in related research by Gribas et al. (2016), it was included in
follow-up considerations.
Tables 2 and Table 3 show relevant information for the six tactics
considered here. Table 2 includes mean scores for interpretation and
also includes superscript designations that identify sets of crisis types
for which specific tactic ratings significantly differ. Table 3 simplifies
this same information by eliminating mean scores and, instead, listing
all tactics that showed significant differences for particular crisis type
pairings.
None of the tactics in Table 2 was among the very highest ranking overall tactics (see Table 1). Of the tactics that showed significant
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differences across crisis type, good intentions, transcendence, and accident were ranked 4, 5, and 6, respectively, overall; defeasibility fell in
the middle of the tactic ranking order; and simple denial and shifting
blame were the bottom two ranked tactics overall. So the consistency
in relative rankings for the highest ranked tactics noted earlier appears
to be validated by the lack of significant differences found in the post
hoc analysis. On the other hand, despite general consistency in relative
rankings for lowest ranked tactics (Table 1), simple denial and shifting blame in particular still reflect statistically significant differences
across crisis type.
Table 3 shows that there were significant differences for five tactics
across the managerial–malevolence crisis type pairing. The same was
true for the managerial–natural disaster pairing. In fact, four of the five
tactics showing significant differences in these two pairings were the
same: simple denial, defeasibility, accident, and good intentions. In all
cases, these tactics were perceived as having a more negative impact
on organizational image in the managerial crisis case than in either
the malevolence case or the natural disaster case. For the managerial–
malevolence pairing, shifting blame showed a similar pattern, and for
the managerial–natural disaster pairing, transcendence showed the
same pattern.
So these two pairings, managerial–malevolence and managerial–
natural disaster, reflected the greatest number of significant differences.
The managerial–systemic pairing also reflected significant differences;
managerial significantly differed from systemic for the simple denial,
shifting blame, and accident tactics. All three of these tactics were
viewed as more problematic for the managerial crisis situation than
for the systemic failure crisis situation.
As noted, the malevolence crisis situation differed significantly
from the managerial crisis situation. Malevolence also showed significant differences from systemic and from natural disaster. Specifically,
simple denial, shifting blame, and accident differed significantly in
the malevolence–systemic pairing, while shifting blame and accident
differed significantly in the malevolence–natural disaster pairing. So
just as managerial differed from all other crisis types in some way, malevolence similarly differed from all others. In every case of significant
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difference, tactic effectiveness ratings were lower for managerial than
for all other crisis types, but that was not true for malevolence pairings.
The accident tactic was viewed less positively for malevolence than
for systemic or natural disaster, but in all other cases, tactics showing
significant differences were viewed more favorably in a malevolence
crisis situation than for other crisis types.
Finally, the only crisis type pairing for which no significant differences emerged was systemic–natural disaster. This does make some
intuitive sense, especially given that image repair is always a response
addressing issues of crisis event responsibility and causality. Systems
may be designed by human agents, but the interdependence of system
parts and the complexity of many systems are such that identifying any
individual source for blame or for attributing causality would be difficult
at best. Similarly, most accept that a natural disaster is an unpredictable
event that defies any kind of causal attribution.
Discussion and Conclusions

Effective crisis planning requires reliable insight into image repair tactic
selection. The root cause crisis type scheme applied in this study seemed
to work well to identify unique variations regarding tactic appropriateness. Overall, our results demonstrate that compensation, corrective
action, and mortification are broadly effective strategies to use, while
the remaining strategies are either not recommended or should be applied only after careful consideration of root cause as well as audience
and situational particulars.
We have noted that effective crisis planning must allow practitioners
to deal with a crisis quickly, avoid speculation, and “provide insights that
can be applied effectively and ethically under extraordinary pressures
of limited time and severe scrutiny of the organization’s legitimacy”
(Heath, 2010, p. 3). Given this challenge, guidelines like the ones just
suggested, although helpful, may be too general to guide truly strategic
crisis planning. Therefore we offer the following crisis planning tactic
selection guidelines based on the results of this study.
Recall that the scale used to rate image repair tactic appropriateness ranged from a low of 1 (This would have a very negative effect on
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my perception of the organization) to a high of 10 (This would have
a very positive effect on my perception of the organization). It makes
some intuitive sense to split that range exactly in half at a score of 5.5
and to consider tactics rated in the upper half as ones we would recommend. This approach would be reasonable because we would be
recommending tactics rated as having at least some overall positive
effect on improving people’s perceptions of the organization. However,
given the somewhat negatively skewed distribution of scores for these
tactics, such an approach would lead us to “not recommend” the vast
majority of strategies under any circumstances. This would offer a
very limited and limiting set of options to practitioners designing crisis response plans. Instead, for the purposes of suggesting crisis plan
recommendations, we determined that tactics scoring an average of
above 5.0 should be categorized as “recommend” and anything at or
below 5.0 categorized as “do not recommend.” Though a tactic with
an average score between 5.0 and 5.5 is still technically on the “would
have a negative effect” side of the continuum, we can safely deduce that,
to achieve that average, a good percentage of respondents did rate it
positively. For example, the overall average across crisis types for the
accident strategy was 5.0; however, almost 40% of all respondents rated
that strategy from 6 to 10, indicating that it would have some degree
of positive effect on their perceptions.
In the world of crisis management, it is often the case that the goal
is to minimize damage rather than to prevent it and to do as much
good as possible with as many as possible. Finding strategies that make
sense for a particular crisis situation that are likely to have a positive
impact on most or all is likely unrealistic. Therefore we suggest the
following in terms of tactics recommended and not recommended for
consideration as part of a crisis response plan targeted to particular
crisis types:
For Any Crisis Type
• Recommend: compensation, corrective action, mortification,
good intentions
• Do not recommend: simple denial, shift blame, attack accuser,
differentiation, bolstering, provocation
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Additions for Malevolence Crisis Type
• Recommend: transcendence
• Do not recommend: accident, minimization, defeasibility
Additions for Managerial Failure Crisis Type
• Recommend: N/A
• Do not recommend: accident, minimization, defeasibility, transcendence
Additions for Systemic Failure Crisis Type
• Recommend: transcendence, accident, minimization
• Do not recommend: defeasibility
Additions for Natural Disaster Crisis Type
• Recommend: transcendence, accident, minimization, defeasibility
• Do not recommend: N/A
These guidelines reinforce our earlier discussion; a handful of tactics, no matter the crisis, are most likely to improve the organization’s image among audience members. Three of these—compensation, corrective action, and mortification—are consistent with what
Coombs called “accommodative” strategies or tactics that focus on
victims’ concerns. Conversely, six tactics appear to have a more negative effect on audience perceptions of the organization across all crisis types. Four of these—simple denial, shifting the blame, attacking
the accuser, and provocation—are similar to Coombs’s description
of “defensive” strategies that work more to protect the organization.
Therefore the results reinforce that, if it is at all possible, organizations
experiencing a crisis should adopt accommodative tactics and avoid
defensive tactics.
However, this general principle cannot be fully embraced, because
accident and defeasibility are clearly defensive rather than accommodative, and these show on the “recommend” list for some crisis types.
Additionally, avoiding the defensive tactics is not always possible or
reasonable. During the 1993 Pepsi scare, when foreign objects (syringes,

Organizational Image Repair Tactics and Crisis Type

243

bullets, etc.) were found in the soft drink’s cans and plastic bottles, the
Pepsi crisis team engaged in simple denial, claiming that the objects
could not have been introduced at the bottling plant. Pepsi circulated
press releases with vivid graphics showing bottles hanging upside down
until a split second before they were filled, demonstrating the difficulty
of inserting objects at the plant. Pepsi’s claims were supported by the
Food and Drug Administration’s commissioner, David Kessler, who
agreed Pepsi was the victim of copycat hoaxes. Additionally, surveillance cameras in a Colorado supermarket showed a woman opening
a Pepsi and inserting a syringe into it. Though simple denial is not an
accommodative strategy, most experts believe Pepsi was successful
in restoring its image (Holmes, 1993). However, the Pepsi example
also demonstrated that, for denial to be effective, organizations must
summon an enormous amount of evidence for this defensive tactic to
work effectively.
Managerial Crisis

It is clear by looking at the “recommend” tactics that the managerial crisis presents the most difficult situation for the PR practitioner,
because only the four tactics recommended for all crisis types seem
likely to improve the audience’s perception of the organization. Managerial crises are created through skewed management values, deception,
misconduct, or some combination of the three. Because responsibility
for the crisis rests so heavily on the organization and its leadership, it
makes sense that the only real options available all admit that a crisis
occurred and then attempt to compensate, correct, or apologize for that
event. For example, in 2016, Wells Fargo Bank experienced a serious
managerial crisis when thousands of employees created 1.5 million fake
accounts and 565,000 credit card accounts for existing customers, none
of which were authorized by those customers, to earn bonuses and
meet aggressive sales targets (Comcowich, 2016). Although the firm
apologized and eventually engaged in corrective action by discontinuing the incentive program, they shifted the blame to (and fired) 5,300
lower level employees. Unfortunately, this failed to address the real
problem: skewed management values that focused on the short-term
profits of cross-selling.
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Our tactical guidelines imply that shifting the blame likely would
have had a negative effect on people’s perceptions of the organization,
and that is exactly what happened with Wells Fargo. The organization’s attempt to shift the blame overshadowed its other image repair
tactics and brought them stinging rebukes from the media and Senator Elizabeth Warren on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, among others (Peck & Carter, 2016). Therefore, in
a managerial crisis, organizations must focus on compensation, corrective action, mortification, and good intentions and do everything
possible to steer clear of other tactics.
Malevolence Crisis

Five tactics have potential to improve the audience’s perception of the
organization in a malevolence crisis situation: compensation, corrective
action, mortification, good intentions, and transcendence. Significance
tests showed that, although shifting the blame does not necessarily help
the organization’s image, it is at least a significantly more acceptable
tactic for malevolence than for any of the other three crisis types. This
makes sense given that the malevolent actor is an easy target for blame
shifting, and this tactic, combined with several of the recommended
tactics, might be effective at improving the organization’s image.
Systemic Crisis

There are seven recommended tactical options available for improving
the organization’s image in a systemic failure crisis: compensation, corrective action, mortification, good intentions, accident, transcendence,
and minimization. In systemic failure crises, even a number of tactics
considered defensive seem to be seen as potentially effective. Significance testing shows that good intentions is viewed more positively in
the systemic crisis than in the managerial crisis, and accident is viewed
more positively in the systemic crisis than in either the managerial or
malevolence crisis. Although shifting the blame is not recommended
for any crisis type, it is seen as significantly more positive (or less negative) for the systemic crisis than for the managerial crisis.
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Natural Disaster

The natural disaster crisis offers the organization the largest number
of recommended image repair tactical options, including compensation, corrective action, mortification, good intentions, transcendence,
accident, minimization, and defeasibility. By its definition, a natural
disaster is difficult to predict and impossible to control. Given the
unpredictable nature of natural disasters, it makes sense that good
intentions and appeals to accident would work in these circumstances,
despite the fact that they are on the defensive end of the continuum.
The natural disaster suggests little to no organizational responsibility,
and therefore there seems to be a larger number of legitimate tactical
possibilities.
Limitations

These results and our tactical guide clearly identify strategies that are
and are not recommended. However, recommendations based on the
public’s positive or negative ratings of tactics may not be consistent with
realities faced by PR practitioners. For example, we outlined earlier some
instances where denial might need to be used, even though generally
it is not seen positively as a strategy. On the other hand, mortification
(taking responsibility and making an apology) was rated positively for
all crisis types. However, PR practitioners must be aware that an apology can come with legal ramifications. According to Meyers (2016),
there are currently 38 “I’m sorry” laws taking multiple forms spanning
37 states and the District of Columbia. Twenty of the jurisdictions
exempt fault-based apologies from evidence, while 18 jurisdictions
include fault-based apologies in evidence. When considering an apology, PR practitioners must be aware of state laws, and when legal and
financial liability risks are high, they must consider the use of language
that emphasizes sympathy and empathy while minimizing fault. This
would be in line with findings by Coombs and Holladay (2008) that
“respondents had similar reactions to sympathy, compensation, and
apology response strategies” (p. 255). PR practitioners must also evaluate and manage any nonverbal apologies (Meyers, 2016).
For a practitioner guide to be truly useful, it should be dependable as a resource across crisis types, contexts, and audiences. While
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we hope our proposed guidelines offer such versatility of application, we know that the design of this study has limitations that make
broad application something to be proved in practice and over time.
To consider the relative impact of 14 different crisis tactics and avoid
impossible complication of research design and analysis, it was necessary to work with a single crisis scenario with some modifications to
suggest various crisis types. We believe this approach was justified to
avoid seriously confounding the results. If, for instance, the managerial
crisis had dealt with some financial impropriety while the malevolence
crisis dealt with some dangerous equipment failure and the systemic
and natural disaster crises were similarly distinct in nature, this would
have introduced a confounding variable into the study. So, for purposes
of control, the approach taken here was to keep the crisis scenario
consistent across conditions. At the same time, it does mean that the
results and implications could be limited to similar crisis scenarios.
Our scenario involved an organization that was relatively large, loosely
coupled (Weick, 1976), and institutional, and the crisis outcome was
rather serious in that it resulted in bodily injury and multiple deaths.
It is reasonable to question whether the same results would be seen if
considering these same crisis types for a smaller, for-profit, corporate
firm in a rapidly changing competitive market or with a crisis that had
different, much less serious consequences.
We also acknowledge the limitations of looking at individual tactics
out of context. Respondents were directed to consider a crisis response
characterized by 14 image repair tactics, but, by design, they were asked
to consider the tactics individually and one at a time. However, it would
be a rare occurrence indeed for even a very brief crisis response to rely
on a single tactic. In response to crises, multiple image repair tactics are
typically used together in ways, it is hoped, that are seen as consistent
and complementary.
Future Research

We believe that the preceding guidelines have face validity. In light of
the limitations discussed, though, we suggest that they should be applied
with due caution, at least until future research offers greater validation.
Such research would do well to intentionally consider a different crisis
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scenario than used here or, even better, to limit consideration to one or
a few image repair tactics applied to a variety of crisis scenarios. Additionally, future work might do well to explore the interplay of tactic
combinations. Given the promising results by Gribas et al. (2016) and
from the current study, we believe that such research building on, extending, and, we hope, validating this work is warranted.
Although we advocate this continued exploration, we also note that
the findings here, as well as in past related research, were not particularly
striking in terms of application. For example, in this study, most of the
tactics showing significant differences across crisis type were middleof-the-road tactics; that is, with the exception of simple denial and
shifting the blame, they were tactics viewed as not highly effective nor
as highly ineffective. For the most part, crisis type seems most relevant
when considering image repair tactics that, at best, may have a slightly
positive to slightly negative impact on audience perception. Stronger
findings related to tactics with greater positive or negative impact would
have offered something more worthy of a PR practitioner’s attention.
What is striking is how similar these findings are to those from
other studies (Brown & White, 2011; Claeys et al., 2010; Coombs &
Holladay, 1996; Gribas et al., 2016). The search for the ideal tactics to
suit particular crises, audience types, and other situational variables
has yet to reveal exceptional and compelling prescriptive advice for
practitioners. Given this, it seems possible that the way people perceive
organizational image repair attempts may rest in something less situational and more in cultural notions of effective “apologia.” As applied
in rhetorical criticism, apologia is understood as a formal defense or
justification of actions. The results of these organizational image repair studies, all of which have utilized U.S. participants, suggest that
there might be an underlying cultural apologia script that demands
organizations in crisis embrace certain culturally appropriate accommodative responses and avoid certain culturally inappropriate defensive
responses. So it may be that there are culturally derived social scripts
dictating proper organizational image repair efforts, no matter the type
of crisis or audience.
Initial support for this possibility has been found in a work in progress by DiSanza, Legge, Hartman, Carr, and Gribas (2017) that compared
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U.S. and Middle Eastern respondents in regard to their perceptions of
the effectiveness of various image repair tactics. Preliminary analyses
suggested that U.S. participants responded very favorably to accommodative tactics and very negatively to defensive tactics; however, Middle
Eastern audiences did not seem to have the same degree of negative
response to defensive tactics. In fact, for this Middle Eastern sample,
differences between the most defensive tactics and the most accommodative tactics were negligible. Though this is still quite speculative,
we suggest that cross-cultural studies of the effectiveness of image
repair tactics is one fruitful new direction for future organizational
crisis response research.
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